Individual Differences in Subjective Experience First-Person Constraints on Theories of Consciousness, Subconsciousness, and Self-Consciousness Robert G. ...

The 3Rs, or the replacement, reduction, and refinement of animal research, are widely accepted as the best approach to maximizing high-quality science while ensuring the highest standard of ethical consideration is applied in regulating the use of animals in scientific procedures. This contrasts with the muted scientific interest in the 3Rs when they were first proposed in The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique. Indeed, the relative success of the 3Rs has done little to encourage engagement with their original text, which (...) remains little read and out of print. By adopting a historical perspective, this article argues that one explanation for this disjunction may be found in another, more celebrated, event of 1959: C. P. Snow’s Rede lecture on The Two Cultures. The moral outlook of The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique derived from an earlier ethos wherein humanistic and scientific values occupied a shared culture. While the synthetic style of The Principles has hindered its readership, this article concludes that there is value to recovering the notion that the humanities and social sciences can contribute to the improvement of animal research. (shrink)

Most of the time when historians study chemistry the subject dealt with is what might be called élite chemistry. This is chemistry at the cutting edge, chemistry which makes a difference to how we come to understand the properties of matter, molecules, reactions, and so on. Other associated matters which may be explored by historians of chemistry concern social, economic or political relationships with élite chemistry. In this Debus Lecture I want to consider what possibilities there were that the working-class (...) would be able to learn about chemistry in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, and how and why this was achieved. (shrink)

The general thrust of the dissertation may be captured by the following two claims: some mental properties play a causal role in the production of purposive behaviour; and both the intrinsic and extrinsic features of those properties may be causally efficacious in the production of such behaviour, is a claim in favour of mental causation; I take to be a claim in favour of what I refer to as an 'anti-individualistic' version of the doctrine. In the first two chapters, I (...) defend , whereas the third chapter supports claim . In the fourth chapter, I argue that the extrinsic, relational features of some mental properties have their own implementation mechanisms by which they control and structure behaviour. The last chapter, which is also the conclusion of the dissertation, is turned towards future research. It offers a general framework from which to investigate the role of semantic properties in the production of behaviour. The chapter also attempts to delineate the general features of an etiological approach to those properties. (shrink)

In 1993, an astonishing discovery was made at a tomb in Guodian in Hubei province (east central China). Written on strips of bamboo that have miraculously survived intact since 300 B.C., the "Guodian Laozi," is by far the earliest version of the _Tao Te Ching_ ever unearthed. Students of ancient Chinese civilization proclaimed the text a decisive breakthrough in the understanding of this famous text: it provides the most conclusive evidence to date that the text was the work of multiple (...) authors and editors over hundreds of years, rather than the achievement of a single individual writing during the time of Confucius. Robert Henricks now presents the first English translation of the "bamboo slip Laozi." Differing substantially from other versions we have of the text, the Guodian Laozi provides us with clues on how and when the text came into being. As Henricks's translation shows, many chapters are missing in this form of the text, and some chapters remain incomplete. All of this seems to suggest that the _Tao Te Ching_ was not yet "complete" when these slips were copied. In his translation, Henricks focuses attention on lines in each of the chapters that vary from readings in other editions. In addition, he shows how the sequence of chapters in this form of the text is totally unrelated to the sequence readers commonly see in the "standard" form of the text, i.e., in other translations. Here are just a few of the noteworthy features of this new _Tao Te Ching:_ • A lucid introduction to the Guodian Laozi, offering background on the archaeological interpretation of the discovery • Line-by-line comparisons of the Guodian Laozi against the Mawangdui and Wang Bi editions • Extensive notes on each chapter describing the unique elements of the Guodian Laozi in comparison with other versions • Transcriptions for each chapter, noting both the ancient and modern form of the characters in the chapter • An appendix featuring the official biography of Laozi written by Sima Qian, the Grand Historian of China, as well as Henricks's commentary and notes on this biography This groundbreaking work will lead to a reassessment of the history and significance of this well-known and critical work as well as a reevaluation of the role it played in the development of Taoism in early China. (shrink)

This original new work takes a sharply focused look at Berkeley's ontology and provides a fuller understanding of the relationship between, on the one hand, Berkeley's nominalism and antiabstractionism and, on the other, his principal arguments for idealism and his attempts to square his idealism with common sense. Drawing heavily on detailed textual analysis, historical context, and careful examination of the work of other scholars, Muehlmann challenges, modifies, rejects, and exploits some well-established interpretations of Berkeley's philosophy.

In this paper I distinguish two kinds of predictivism, 'timeless' and 'historicized'. The former is the conventional understanding of predictivism. However, I argue that its defense in the works of John Worrall and Patrick Maher is wanting. Alternatively, I promote an historicized predictivism, and briefly defend such a predictivism at the end of the paper.

Introduction -- Reconstructing Nīsābūrī's early education -- Nīsābūrī's early scientific thought -- Nīsābūrī's early religious thought -- Astrology motivating inductions about God's power -- Nīsābūrī's later scientific thought -- The impact of science on Nīsābūrī's religious thought -- The limits of science's influence on Nīsābūrī's religious thought -- Conclusion.

The revolution involving the foundations of the physical sciences heralded by relativity and quantum theories has been stimulating philosophers for many years. Both of these comprehensive sets of concepts have involved profound challenges to traditional theories of epistemology, ontology, and language. This volume gathers six experts in physics, logic and philosophy to discuss developments in space exploration and nuclear science and their impact on the philosophy of science.

It is often claimed that anti-realists are compelled to reject the inference of the knowability paradox, that there are no unknown truths. I call those anti-realists who feel so compelled ‘faint-hearted’, and argue in turn that anti-realists should affirm this inference, if it is to be consistent. A major part of my strategy in defending anti-realism is to formulate an anti-realist definition of truth according to which a statement is true only if it is verified by someone, at some time. (...) I also liberalize what is meant by a verification to allow for indirect forms of verification. From this vantage point, I examine a key objection to anti-realism, that it is committed to the necessary existence of minds, and reject a response to this problem set forth by Michael Hand. In turn I provide a more successful anti-realist response to the necessary minds problem that incorporates what I call an ‘agential’ view of verification. I conclude by considering what intellectual cost there is to being an anti-realist in the sense I am advocating. (shrink)

In this paper, I raise some questions about Pritchard ’s internalist argument for scepticism. I argue that his internalism begs the question in support of scepticism. Correlatively I advance what I take to be a better internalist argument for scepticism, one that leaves open the possibility of empirically adjudicating sceptical hypotheses. I close by discussing what it means to be an internalist.

Nursing advocacy for patients is considered to be an essential component of nursing practice. This phenomenological qualitative pilot study explored registered nurses' lived experience of nursing advocacy with patients using a sample of three medical-surgical registered nurses. The guiding research questions were: (1) how do registered nurses practicing in the medical-surgical specialty area describe their experiences with nursing advocacy for their patients; and (2) what reflections on educational preparation for their professional roles do registered nurses identify as related to their (...) practices of nursing advocacy with their patients? Data analysis procedures were based on Moustakas' data analysis method, and Lincoln and Guba's criteria were applied for rigor. The emergent themes were: speaking out and speaking for patients; being compelled to act on unmet needs of patients; fulfillment and frustration; the patient is changed; primarily learned on the job; and confidence gained through practice. The findings increase the body of knowledge surrounding nursing advocacy as practiced by nurses. (shrink)

Theoretical explication of a growing body of empirical data on consciousness-related anomalous phenomena is unlikely to be achieved in terms of known physical processes. Rather, it will first be necessary to formulate the basic role of consciousness in the definition of reality before such anomalous experience can adequately be represented. This paper takes the position that reality is constituted only in the interaction of consciousness with its environment, and therefore that any scheme of conceptual organization developed to represent that reality (...) must reflect the processes of consciousness as well as those of its environment. In this spirit, the concepts and formalisms of elementary quantum mechanics, as originally proposed to explain anomalous atomic-scale physical phenomena, are appropriated via metaphor to represent the general characteristics of consciousness interacting with any environment. More specifically, if consciousness is represented by a quantum mechanical wave function, and its environment by an appropriate potential profile, Schrödinger wave mechanics defines eigenfunctions and eigenvalues that can be associated with the cognitive and emotional experiences of that consciousness in that environment. To articulate this metaphor it is necessary to associate certain aspects of the formalism, such as the coordinate system, the quantum numbers, and even the metric itself, with various impressionistic descriptors of consciousness, such as its intensity, perspective, approach/avoidance attitude, balance between cognitive and emotional activity, and receptive/assertive disposition. With these established, a number of the generic features of quantum mechanics, such as the wave/particle duality, and the uncertainty, indistinguishability, and exclusion principles, display metaphoric relevance to familiar individual and collective experiences. Similarly, such traditional quantum theoretic exercises as the central force field and atomic structure, covalent molecular bonds, barrier penetration, and quantum statistical collective behavior become useful analogies for representation of a variety of consciousness experiences, both normal and anomalous, and for the design of experiments to study these systematically. (shrink)

The competence of humans to create and apply constructs of reality far exceeds that of any other animal species. Their ability to consciously manipulate such models seems unique, but it remains unknown how these abilities were initially acquired and then developed. Most individuals hold strong, culturally-anchored beliefs that their particular reality is true, a viewpoint challenged by the observation that all such constructs are different. They reflect not reality, but each individual’s life experiences. Collectively they facilitated the development of hominins (...) to unprecedented cultural and cognitive complexity. However, it remains entirely unknown how the human brain manages to create a model of the external world from the signals provided by sensory equipment and proprioceptors. This paper examines the roles of exograms in this development, as they are considered to be the only tangible connection between the brain, the faculties of sentience and the external world. Competency in exogram use became a crucial natural selection factor for humans and even overcame the human brain atrophy of the final Pleistocene and the Holocene. Under favourable conditions, some forms of exograms are capable of surviving from the deep time of human evolution. The paper follows their trail back in time to gain some insights into the developments that gave rise to human awareness, self-consciousness and Theory of Mind as we understand them. Specific archaeological finds and notions about sentient capabilities of hominins are presented in a search for exogram use in the course of human evolution. It results in a model that explains with clarity not only the course of the human journey but also the underlying reasons for the human condition as such: why we are the way we are. (shrink)

Recent scholarship (by mainly Michael Friedman, but also by Thomas Uebel) on the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap covering the period from the publication of Carnap’s’ 1928 book Der Logische Aufbau der Welt through to the mid to late 1930’s has tended to view Carnap as espousing a form of conventionalism (epitomized by his adoption of the principle of tolerance) and not a form of empirical foundationalism. On this view, it follows that Carnap’s 1934 The Logical Syntax of Language is the (...) pinnacle of his work during this era, this book having developed in its most complete form the conventionalist approach to dissolving the pseudoproblems that often attend philosophical investigation. My task in this paper, in opposition to this trend, is to resuscitate the empiricist interpretation of Carnap’s work during this time period. The crux of my argument is that Carnap’s 1934 book, by eschewing for the most part the empiricism he espouses in the Aufbau and in his 1932 The Unity of Science, is led to a form of conventionalism that faces the serious hazard of collapsing into epistemological relativism. My speculation is that Carnap came to recognize this deficiency in his 1934 book, and in subsequent work (“Testability and Meaning”, published in 1936/37) felt the need to re-instate his empiricist agenda. This subsequent work provides a much improved empiricist epistemology from Carnap’s previous efforts and, ashistory informs us, sets the standard for future research in the theory of confirmation. (shrink)

In 1912, Henri Poincaré published an argument which apparently shows that the hypothesis of quanta is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of Planck''s experimentally corroborated law describing the spectral distribution of radiant energy in a black body. In a recent paper, John Norton has reaffirmed the authority of Poincarés argument, setting it up as a paradigm case in which empirical data can be used to definitively rule out theoretical competitors to a given theoretical hypothesis. My goal is to (...) dispute Norton ''s claim that there is no theoretical underdetermination problem arising between classical physics and early quantum theory. The strategy I use in defending my view is to adopt a suggestion made by Jarrett Leplin and Larry Laudan on how to assess the relative merits of competing theoretical alternatives, where each alternative has an equal capacity to save the phenomena. In the course of the paper, I distinguish between two branches of classical physics: classical mechanics and classical electromagnetism. The former is claimed by Norton and Poincaré to be determinately ruled out by the black body evidence; and it is the former that I argue is compatible with this evidence. (shrink)

The paper is a reply to g s robinson's criticism in "analysis," volume 31, Of popper's attempt to clarify the notion of scientific progress in terms of verisimilitude. I argue that robinson (1) misunderstands popper's account of basic statements, (2) confuses verisimilitude with probability (despite popper's explicit warnings), And (3) fails to understand the sense in which popper claims that verisimilitude is objective.

Patient advocacy is an important aspect of nursing care, yet there are few instruments to measure this essential function. This study was conducted to develop, determine the psychometric properties, and support validity of the Protective Nursing Advocacy Scale (PNAS), which measures nursing advocacy beliefs and actions from a protective perspective. The study used a descriptive correlational design with a systematically selected sample of 419 medical-surgical registered nurses. Analysis of the 43-item instrument was conducted using principal components analysis with promax rotation, (...) which resulted in the items loading onto four components. The four subscales have sufficient internal consistency, as did the overall PNAS. Satisfactory evidence of construct, content, and convergent validity were determined. Implications for nursing practice include using the PNAS in conjunction with an educational program to enhance advocacy skills, which may help to improve patient outcomes. (shrink)